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Timberland Stockists Brisbane auction mechanism that provides dominant strategies
A double auction mechanism that provides dominant strategies for Cheap Timberland Safety Boots both buyers Timberland Stockists Brisbane and sellers is analyzed. This mechanism satisfies the <img height="18" border="0" style="vertical-align:bottom" width="26" alt="" title="" src="http://origin-ars.els-cdn.com/content/image/1-s2.0-002205319290091U-si1.gif"> convergence to efficiency of the buyer's bid double auction. In addition, the mechanism always produces full information first best prices; the inefficiency arises because the least valuable profitable trade may be prohibited by the mechanism. The mechanism has an oral implementation utilizing bid and asked prices. We consider a dynamic trade relationship where quality is not contractible and potential sellers retain quality-relevant private information. We show that the presence of an investment technology to improve the incumbent seller’s innate quality may impair the efficiency of the screening process. If the conflict is effective, the buyer has to induce an inefficient screening process or reduce the productivity of the investment technology. This conflict suggests that the hold-up problem may be more severe than predicted by models of incomplete contracts that assume complete information.